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PAYOFF PERFORMANCE OF FICTITIOUS PLAY
GEORG OSTROVSKI AND SEBASTIAN VAN STRIEN
Abstract. We investigate how well continuous-time fictitious play in two-player games
performs in terms of average payoff, particularly compared to Nash equilibrium payoff.
We show that in many games, fictitious play outperforms Nash equilibrium on average
or even at all times, and moreover that any game is linearly equivalent to one in which
this is the case. Conversely, we provide conditions under which Nash equilibrium payoff
dominates fictitious play payoff. A key step in our analysis is to show that fictitious play
dynamics asymptotically converges the set of coarse correlated equilibria (a fact which is
implicit in the literature).
Continuous-time fictitious play (FP) has been first introduced by Brown [7, 8] and it
has since been a standard model for myopic learning, often used as a convenient refer-
ence algorithm due to its computational simplicity (see, for example, [11, 31]). It has
been shown to converge to Nash equilibrium in many important classes of games, such as
zero-sum games [19], non-degenerate 2×n games [3], non-degenerate quasi-supermodular
games with diminishing returns or of dimension 3 × n or 4 × 4 [5, 4], and others. On the
other hand, convergence to Nash equilibrium (even when it is unique) is not guaranteed,
as demonstrated by Shapley’s famous example [27] of a 3 × 3 Rock-Paper-Scissors-like
game with a stable limit cycle for FP. Note that in Rock-Paper-Scissors-like games with
an attracting limit cycle, the limit cycle is generally not globally attracting: uncountably
many orbits are still attracted to the Nash equilibrium, see [30, Theorem 1.1].
The question therefore arises whether in the non-convergent case the payoff to the play-
ers along trajectories of FP compares favourably to Nash equilibrium payoff. In this paper
we investigate the relation between Nash equilibrium payoff and average payoff along FP
trajectories. In particular, we show that in many two-player games, FP may in the long
run earn a higher payoff to both players than Nash equilibrium play, either on average, or
even at all times. We also show that every two-player game is ‘linearly equivalent’ to one in
which FP Pareto dominates Nash equilibrium (at all times, along every non-equilibrium FP
orbit). Conversely, we give conditions under which FP is dominated by Nash equilibrium
in terms of payoff, and show numerical examples for this (rather atypical) behaviour.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 we introduce basic notation. In Section 2
we analyse the limiting behaviour of FP dynamics and show that FP converges to the so-
called set of coarse correlated equilibria. In Section 3 we use this to compare the payoff
along the limit sets with the Nash equilibrium payoffs. Ultimately, this allows us to show
that every bimatrix game is linearly equivalent to one in which FP Pareto dominates Nash
equilibrium and we discuss the conditions governing the payoff comparison of these two.
In Section 4 we present a particular family of 3×3 games in which FP yields higher average
payoff to both players than Nash equilibrium. In Section 5 we investigate the possibility
of games in which Nash equilibrium play dominates FP. We also deduce conditions for
this and numerically determine examples in which this is the case. The discussion shows
that these examples are relatively ‘rare’. Finally, in Section 6 we discuss the implications
of these results for the notions of equilibrium (in the context of payoff performance of
learning algorithms) and game equivalence.
The authors would like to thank Christopher Harris, Sergiu Hart and Ulrich Berger for useful discussions and
comments.
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1. Notation and standard facts
For A = (ai j), B = (bi j) ∈ Rm×n, we denote by (A, B) a bimatrix game with players A and
B having pure strategies S A = {1, . . . ,m} and S B = {1, . . . , n}. We call S = S A×S B the joint
strategy space, and we call a probability distribution over S a joint probability distribution.
By ΣA ⊂ R1×m and ΣB ⊂ Rn×1 we denote the (m − 1)- and (n − 1)-dimensional simplices
of mixed strategies of the two players, and we implicitly identify the pure strategy i ∈ S A
with the ith unit vector in R1×m and j ∈ S B with the jth unit vector in Rn×1. We write
Σ = ΣA × ΣB for the space of mixed strategy profiles. Note that this can be seen as a proper
subset of the set of joint probability distributions.
The payoffs to players A and B from playing the pure strategy profile (i, j) ∈ S A×S B are
ai j and bi j, respectively. By linearity, their expected payoffs from playing a mixed strategy
profile (x, y) ∈ Σ = ΣA × ΣB are
uA(x, y) = xAy and uB(x, y) = xBy.
The players’ best response correspondences BRA : ΣB → ΣA and BRB : ΣA → ΣB are
given by
BRA(q) B arg max
p¯∈ΣA
p¯Aq and BRB(p) B arg max
q¯∈ΣB
pBq¯.
We further denote the maximal-payoff functions
A¯(q) B max
p¯∈ΣA
p¯Aq and B¯(p) B max
q¯∈ΣB
pBq¯,
so that A¯(q) = uA(p¯, q) for p¯ ∈ BRA(q) and B¯(p) = uB(p, q¯) for q¯ ∈ BRB(p). Observe that
A¯(q) = maxi (Aq)i and B¯(p) = max j (pB) j: the maximal payoff to player A given player
B’s strategy q is equal to the maximal entry of the vector Aq, and similarly for player B.
For generic bimatrix games, the best response correspondences BRA : ΣB → ΣA and
BRB : ΣA → ΣB are almost everywhere single-valued, with the exception of a finite number
of hyperplanes. The singleton value taken by BRA whenever it is single-valued is always a
pure strategy of player A. When BRA(p) is not a singleton, it is the set of convex combina-
tions of a subset of {ei : i ∈ S A}, that is, a face of the simplex ΣA, or possibly all of ΣA. The
analogous statement holds for BRB.
It follows that ΣA and ΣB can be divided into respectively n and m regions (in fact, closed
convex polytopes):
RBj B BRB−1( j) ⊆ ΣA for j ∈ S B,
RAi B BRA−1(i) ⊆ ΣB for i ∈ S A.
We will call RAi the preference region of strategy i for player A, as it is the (closed) subset of
the second player’s strategies against which player A expects the highest payoff by playing
strategy i; similarly, for RBj .
For a generic game (A, B), the subset of ΣB on which BRA contains two distinct pure
strategies i, i′ ∈ S A (and hence all their convex combinations) is contained in a codimension-
one hyperplane of ΣB:
ZAii′ B {q ∈ ΣB : (Aq)i = (Aq)i′ ≥ (Aq)k ∀k ∈ S A} = RAi ∩ RAi′ ⊆ ΣB.
Analogously, for j, j′ ∈ S B,
ZBj j′ B {p ∈ ΣA : (pB) j = (pB) j′ ≥ (pB)l ∀l ∈ S B} = RBj ∩ RBj′ ⊆ ΣA.
These hyperplanes are subsets of linear codimension-one subspaces of ΣB and ΣA, respec-
tively. See Figure 1 for an illustration in the case n = m = 3. We call these sets the
indifference sets of players A and B.
Definition 1.1. A mixed strategy profile (p¯, q¯) ∈ Σ is a Nash equilibrium, if p¯ ∈ BRA(q¯)
and q¯ ∈ BRB( p¯). If a Nash equilibrium lies in the interior of Σ, it is called completely mixed.
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Figure 1. Geometry of a 3 × 3 bimatrix game. The spaces of mixed
strategies ΣA and ΣB are each a simplex spanned by three vertices (the
pure strategies). Note the closed convex preference regions RBj ⊂ ΣA
and RAi ⊂ ΣB, their intersections as indifference sets ZBj j′ and ZAii′ , and the
projections to ΣA and ΣB of the (in this case, unique) Nash equilibrium
(EA, EB) at the intersection of all these sets.
The following lemma is a standard fact and easy to check.
Lemma 1.2. The point (EA, EB) ∈ int(Σ) is a (completely mixed) Nash equilibrium of an
m × n bimatrix game (A, B) if and only if, for all i, i′ = 1, . . . ,m and j, j′ = 1, . . . , n,
(AEB)i = (AEB)i′ and (EAB) j = (EAB) j′ .
Note that this implies that EA ∈ RBj and EB ∈ RAi , for all i, j.
From the various ways to define continuous-time FP, we follow the approach taken
in [15]. We define a continuous-time fictitious play process (p(t), q(t)) ∈ Σ, t ≥ 1, as a
solution to the differential inclusion
p˙(t) ∈ 1
t
(BRA(q(t)) − p(t)), q˙(t) ∈ 1t (BRA(p(t)) − q(t)), (1)
with some initial condition (p(1), q(1)) ∈ Σ (see, for example, [15, 19]).
Alternatively, as in [15], we can denote by x(t) and y(t) the strategies played by the
two players at time t ≥ 0, where x : [0,∞) → ΣA and y : [0,∞) → ΣB are assumed to be
measurable functions. We write the average (empirical) past play of the respective players
from time 0 through t as
p(t) B
1
t
∫ t
0
x(s) ds and q(t) B
1
t
∫ t
0
y(s) ds.
Then continuous-time FP is given by the rule expressed in the following integral inclusions:
x(t) ∈ BRA(q(t)) and y(t) ∈ BRB(p(t)) for t ≥ 1
and (x(t), y(t)) ∈ Σ arbitrary for 0 ≤ t < 1. Defined this way, (p(t), q(t)), t ≥ 1, is
a solution of the differential inclusion (1) with initial condition p(1) =
∫ 1
0 x(s) ds and
q(1) =
∫ 1
0 y(s) ds.
Definition 1.3. We say that two m × n bimatrix games (A, B) and (A˜, B˜) are (linearly)
equivalent, (A, B) ∼ (A˜, B˜), if the matrix A˜ can be obtained by multiplying A with a positive
constant c > 0 and adding constants c1, . . . , cn ∈ R to the matrix columns, and B˜ can be
obtained from B by multiplication with d > 0 and addition of d1, . . . , dm ∈ R to its rows:
a˜i j = c · ai j + c j and b˜i j = d · bi j + di for i = 1, . . . ,m and j = 1, . . . , n.
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The following lemma follows by direct computation.
Lemma 1.4. Let (A, B) and (A˜, B˜) be two m × n bimatrix games. If (A, B) and (A˜, B˜) are
linearly equivalent, then their best response correspondences coincide: BRA ≡ BRA˜ and
BRB ≡ BRB˜. In particular, they have the same Nash equilibria, the same preference regions
and indifference sets, and give rise to the same FP dynamics.
We call two bimatrix games giving rise to the same best response correspondences dy-
namically equivalent.
2. Limit set for FP
In this section we study the long-term behaviour of (continuous-time) FP. It has been
known since Shapley’s famous version of the Rock-Paper-Scissors game [27] that FP does
not necessarily converge to a Nash equilibrium even when the latter is unique, and can
converge to a limit cycle instead. In fact, convergence to a unique Nash equilibrium in
the interior of Σ seems to be rather the exception than the rule: It is a standing conjecture
that such Nash equilibrium can only be stable for FP dynamics, if the game is equivalent
to a zero-sum game [19]. As an aside, we remark that applying a ‘spherical’ projection
of the dynamics of a zero-sum games with a unique interior Nash Equilibrium (projecting
from the Nash Equilibrium onto the boundary of the simplex), gives rise to Hamiltonian
dynamics, see [?].
We will show that every FP orbit converges to (a subset of) the set of so-called ‘coarse
correlated equilibria’, sometimes also referred to as the ‘Hannan set’ (see [14, 31, 16]). In
fact, this result follows directly from the ‘belief affirming’ property of FP1, shown in [22].
However, to the best of our knowledge, the conclusion that FP has its limit set contained
in the set of coarse correlated equilibria has not been mentioned in the literature. We also
provide a slightly different proof of this fact.
The following definition can be found in [24].
Definition 2.1. A joint probability distribution P = (pi j) over S is a coarse correlated
equilibrium (CCE) for the bimatrix game (A, B) if∑
i, j
ai′ j pi j ≤
∑
i, j
ai j pi j
and ∑
i, j
bi j′ pi j ≤
∑
i, j
bi j pi j
for all (i′, j′) ∈ S . The set of CCE is also called the Hannan set.
One way of viewing the concept of CCE is in terms of the notion of regret. Let us
assume that two players are (repeatedly or continuously) playing a bimatrix game (A, B),
and let P(t) = (pi j(t)) be the empirical joint distribution of their past play through time
t, that is, pi j(t) represents the fraction of time of the strategy profile (i, j) along their play
through time t. For x ∈ R, let [x]+ denote the positive part of x: [x]+ = x if x > 0, and
[x]+ = 0 otherwise. Then the expression∑
i, j
ai′ j pi j(t) −
∑
i, j
ai j pi j(t)

+
can be interpreted as the regret of the first player from not having played action i′ ∈ S A
throughout the entire past history of play. It is (the positive part of) the difference be-
tween player A’s actual past payoff2 and the payoff she would have received if she always
1The authors thank Sergiu Hart for pointing out this connection between Theorems 2.2 and 2.4 and [22, 10]
when shown an early draft of this paper.
2Note that
∑
i, j ai j pi j(t) and
∑
i, j bi j pi j(t) are the players’ average payoffs in their play through time t.
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played i′, given that player B would have played the same way as she did. Similarly,
[
∑
i, j bi j′ pi j(t) − ∑i, j bi j pi j(t)]+ is the regret of the second player from not having played
j′ ∈ S B. This regret notion is sometimes called unconditional or external regret to dis-
tinguish it from the internal or conditional regret3. In this context the set of CCE can be
interpreted as the set of joint probability distributions with non-positive regret.
It has been shown that there are learning algorithms with no regret, that is, such that
asymptotically the regret of players playing according to such algorithm is non-positive
for all their actions. Dynamically this means that if both players in a two-player game use
a no-regret learning algorithm, the empirical joint probability distribution of actions taken
by the players converges to (a subset of) the set of CCE (not necessarily to a certain point
in this set).
The concept of no-regret learning (also known as universal consistency, see [10]) and
the first such learning algorithms have been introduced in [6, 14]. More such algorithms
have been found later on and moreover algorithms with asymptotically non-positive condi-
tional regrets have been found (see, for example, [9, 17, 18]; for good surveys see [31, 16]).
We now show that continuous-time FP converges to a subset of CCE, namely the subset
for which equality holds for at least one (i′, j′) ∈ S A × S B in (2).
Theorem 2.2. Every trajectory of FP dynamics (1) in a bimatrix game (A, B) converges to
a subset of the set of CCE, the set of joint probability distributions P = (pi j) over S A × S B
such that for all (i′, j′) ∈ S A × S B∑
i, j
ai′ j pi j ≤
∑
i, j
ai j pi j and
∑
i, j
bi j′ pi j ≤
∑
i, j
bi j pi j, (2)
where equality holds for at least one (i′, j′) ∈ S A × S B. In other words, FP dynamics
asymptotically leads to non-positive (unconditional) regret for both players.
Remark 2.3. (1) Note that an FP orbit (p(t), q(t)), t ≥ 1, gives rise to a joint proba-
bility distribution P(t) = (pi j(t)) via pi j(t) = 1t
∫ t
0 xi(s)y j(s)ds. When we say that
FP converges to a certain set of joint probability distributions, we mean that P(t)
obtained this way converges to this set.
(2) In [22] a stronger result is proved: continuous-time FP is ‘belief affirming’ or
‘Hannan-consistent’. This means that it leads to asymptotically non-positive un-
conditional regret for the player following it, irrespective of her opponent’s play
(even if the opponent is playing according to a different algorithm). We will only
need the weaker statement and provide our own proof for the reader’s convenience.
Proof of Theorem 2.2. We assume that we have an orbit of (1), (p(t), q(t)), t ≥ 0. Recall
that p(t) = 1t
∫ t
0 x(s) ds and q(t) =
1
t
∫ t
0 y(s) ds, where x : [0,∞) → ΣA and y : [0,∞) → ΣB
are measurable functions representing the players’ strategies at any time t ≥ 0, so that
x(t) ∈ BRA(q(t)) and y(t) ∈ BRB(p(t)) for t ≥ 1.
By the envelope theorem (see, for example, [29]), for p¯ ∈ BRA(q) we have that
dA¯(q)
dq
=
∂uA(p, q)
∂q
∣∣∣∣∣
p= p¯
= p¯A.
Therefore, since x(t) ∈ BRA(q(t)) for t ≥ 1,
d
dt
(
tA¯(q(t))
)
= A¯(q(t)) + t
d
dt
(
A¯(q(t))
)
= A¯(q(t)) + t · x(t) · A · dq(t)
dt
.
Using (1) and A¯(q(t)) = x(t) · A · q(t), it follows that
d
dt
(
tA¯(q(t))
)
= A¯(q(t)) + x(t) · A · (y(t) − q(t)) = x(t) · A · y(t)
3Conditional regret is the regret from not having played an action i′ whenever a certain action i has been
played, that is, [
∑
j ai′ j pi j −∑ j ai j pi j]+ for some fixed i ∈ S A.
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for t ≥ 1. We conclude that for T > 1,∫ T
1
x(t) · A · y(t) dt = T A¯(q(T )) − A¯(q(1)),
and therefore
lim
T→∞
(
1
T
(∫ T
0
x(t) · A · y(t) dt
)
− A¯(q(T ))
)
= 0.
Note that
1
T
∫ T
0
x(t) · A · y(t) dt =
∑
i, j
ai j pi j(T ),
where P(T ) = (pi j(T )) is the empirical joint distribution of the two players’ play through
time T . On the other hand,
A¯(q(T )) = max
i′
∑
j
ai′ jq j(T ) = max
i′
∑
i, j
ai′ j pi j(T ).
Hence,
lim
T→∞
∑
i, j
ai j pi j(T ) −max
i′
∑
i, j
ai′ j pi j(T )
 = 0.
By a similar calculation for B, we obtain
lim
T→∞
∑
i, j
bi j pi j(T ) −max
j′
∑
i, j
bi j′ pi j(T )
 = 0.
It follows that any FP orbit converges to the set of CCE. Moreover, these equalities imply
that for a sequence tk → ∞ so that pi j(tk) converges, there exist i′, j′ so that ∑i, j(ai j −
ai′ j)pi j(tk) → 0 and ∑i, j(bi j − bi j′ )pi j(tk) → 0 as k → ∞, proving convergence to the
claimed subset. 
Let us denote the average payoffs through time T along an FP orbit as
uˆA(T ) =
1
T
∫ T
0
x(t) · A · y(t) dt and uˆB(T ) = 1
T
∫ T
0
x(t) · B · y(t) dt.
As a corollary to the proof of the previous theorem we get the following useful result.
Theorem 2.4. In any bimatrix game, along every orbit of FP dynamics we have
lim
T→∞
(
uˆA(T ) − A¯(q(T ))
)
= lim
T→∞
(
uˆB(T ) − B¯(p(T ))
)
= 0.
Remark 2.5. This formulation of the result shows why in [22] this property is called
‘belief affirming’. Since A¯(q(T )) and B¯(p(T )) can be interpreted as the players’ expected
payoffs given their respective opponent’s play q(T ) and p(T ), the above theorem says that
the difference between expected and actual average payoff of each player vanish, so that
asymptotically their ‘beliefs’ are ‘confirmed’ when playing according to FP.
3. FP vs. Nash equilibrium payoff
In this section we investigate the average payoff to players in a two-player game along
the orbits of FP dynamics and compare it to the Nash equilibrium payoff (in particular, in
games with a unique, completely mixed Nash equilibrium). We show that in contrast to
the usual assumption that players should primarily attempt to play Nash equilibrium and
that learning algorithms converging to Nash equilibrium are desirable, the payoff along FP
orbits can in some games be better on average, or even at all times Pareto dominate the
Nash equilibrium payoff.
Moreover, we demonstrate that to every bimatrix game with unique, completely mixed
Nash equilibrium, there is a dynamically equivalent game for which this superiority of FP
over Nash equilibrium holds.
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Throughout the rest of this section we will assume that all the games under consideration
have a unique, completely mixed Nash equilibrium point (EA, EB) (it is a well-known fact
that in such a game, both players necessarily have the same number of strategies). A first
simple situation in which FP can improve upon such a Nash equilibrium is given by the
following direct consequence of Theorem 2.4.
Proposition 3.1. Let (A, B) be a bimatrix game with unique, completely mixed Nash equi-
librium (EA, EB). If A¯(q) ≥ A¯(EB) and B¯(p) ≥ B¯(EA) for all (p, q) ∈ Σ, then asymptotically
the average payoff along FP orbits is greater than or equal to the Nash equilibrium payoff
(for both players).
Remark 3.2. The hypothesis of this proposition, A¯(q) ≥ A¯(EB) and B¯(p) ≥ B¯(EA) for all
(p, q) ∈ Σ, means that
uA(EA, EB) = min
q∈ΣB
max
p∈ΣA
pAq and uB(EA, EB) = min
p∈ΣA
max
q∈ΣB
pBq,
that is, the Nash equilibrium payoff equals the minmax payoff of the players. For a non-
zero-sum game this is a rather strong assumption, suggesting an unusually bad Nash equi-
librium in terms of payoff. However, as we will show in the next result, at least from a
dynamical point of view, the situation is not at all exceptional.
Theorem 3.3. Let (A, B) be an n × n bimatrix game with unique, completely mixed Nash
equilibrium (EA, EB). Then there exists a linearly equivalent game (A′, B′), for which
A¯′(q) > A¯′(EB) and B¯′(p) > B¯′(EA) for all p ∈ ΣA \ {EA} and q ∈ ΣB \ {EB}.
This result states that every bimatrix game with unique, completely mixed Nash equi-
librium is linearly equivalent to one in which players are better off playing FP than playing
the (unique) Nash equilibrium strategy. In the proof we will need the following lemma.
Lemma 3.4. Let (A, B) be an n × n bimatrix game with unique, completely mixed Nash
equilibrium (EA, EB). Then for each k ∈ S A, LAk B
(⋂
i,k RAi
)
\ RAk is non-empty. More
precisely, LAk is a ray from E
B in the direction vk, such that any (n − 1) of the n vectors
v1, . . . , vn form a basis for the space {v ∈ Rn : ∑i vi = 0}. The analogous statement applies
to LBl B
(⋂
j,l RBj
)
\ RBl , l ∈ S B.
Proof. Define the projection
pi :
x ∈ Rn : ∑
i
xi = 1
→ Rn−1, pi(x1, . . . , xn) = (x1, . . . , xn−1),
and note that pi is invertible with inverse
pi−1(y) = (y1, . . . , yn−1, 1 −
n−1∑
k=1
yk).
For q ∈ ΣB we have that ∑nk=1 qk = 1 and therefore
(Aq)i − (Aq) j =
n∑
k=1
(aik − a jk)qk =
n−1∑
k=1
(aik − a jk − ain + a jn)qk + (ain − a jn),
and we define the affine map P : Rn−1 → Rn−1 by
Pl(x) =
n−1∑
k=1
(al,k − al+1,k − al,n + al+1,n)xk + (al,n − al+1,n),
for l = 1, . . . , n − 1 (that is, Pl(x) = A(pi−1(x))l − A(pi−1(x))l+1).
Recall from Lemma 1.2 that for (p, q) ∈ Σ, q = EB if and only if (Aq)i = (Aq) j for all
i, j, and p = EA if and only if (pB)i = (pB) j for all i, j. It follows that
P(x) = 0 if and only if x = pi(EB).
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In particular, the affine map P is invertible and there is a unique vector v1 ∈ {v ∈ Rn :∑
i vi = 0}, such that P(pi(EB + v1)) = w1 B (−1, 0, . . . , 0)>. Since EB is in the interior
of ΣB, x1 = EB + s · v1 ∈ ΣB for sufficiently small s > 0, and we have that P(pi(x1)) =
(−s, 0, . . . , 0)>. By the definition of P, this means that
(Ax1)1 < (Ax1)2 = (Ax1)3 = · · · = (Ax1)n.
Hence x1 ∈ LA1 =
(⋂
k,1 RAk
)
\ RA1 . Note also that every x ∈ LA1 is of the form EB + s · v1 for
some s > 0, that is, LA1 is a ray from the point E
B.
For 1 < k < n, let wk be the vector in Rn with (k− 1)th and kth entries equal to 1 and −1
respectively, and all other entries equal to 0. Then choose vk such that P(pi(EB + vk)) = wk.
Again for sufficiently small s > 0, we get xk = EB + s · vk ∈ LAk . Finally, for k = n, let
wk = (0, . . . , 0, 1) and proceed as above to get vn and xn = EB + vn ∈ LAn .
Writing the affine map P as P(x) = Mx + b for some invertible matrix M ∈ R(n−1)×(n−1)
and b ∈ Rn−1, we get
wk = P(pi(EB + vk)) = P(pi(EB)) + M(vk1, . . . , v
k
n−1)
> = M(vk1, . . . , v
k
n−1)
>, k = 1, . . . , n.
Since any n − 1 of the vectors
w1 =

−1
0
0
...
0

, w2 =

1
−1
0
...
0

, . . . , wn−1 =

0
...
0
1
−1

, wn =

0
...
0
0
1

are linearly independent and M is invertible, it follows that any n−1 of the vectors v1, . . . , vn
are linearly independent, as claimed.
The same argument applied to the matrix B> shows the analogous result for LBl , l =
1, . . . , n, which finishes the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 3.3. Let A′ ∈ Rn×n, such that a′i j = ai j+c j for some c = (c1, . . . , cn) ∈ Rn.
Then for any q ∈ ΣB,
A¯′(q) = max
i
(
A′q
)
i = maxi
Aq +
n∑
j=1
c jq j ·

1
...
1


i
= A¯(q) + c · q. (3)
Observe that, restricted to RAk , level sets of A¯ are precisely the (n − 2)-dimensional
hyperplane pieces in ΣB orthogonal to ak, the kth row vector of A:
q − q˜ ⊥ ak ⇔ q · ak = q˜ · ak ⇔ maxj (Aq) j = maxj (Aq˜) j for q, q˜ ∈ R
A
k .
So all level sets of A¯ restricted to RAk are parallel hyperplane pieces. Figure 2 illustrates this
situation for the case n = 3.
By Lemma 3.4 we can choose n points Q1, . . . ,Qn ∈ ΣB such that
Qk ∈ LAk =
⋂
i,k
RAi
 \ RAk .
Each point Qk is in the relative interior of the line segment LAk ⊂ ΣB. This line segment
has endpoint EB and is adjacent to all of the regions RAi , i , k. By the same lemma,
Q1 − EB, . . . ,Qn−1 − EB form a basis for {v ∈ Rn : ∑k vk = 0}. Therefore, the vectors
Q1, . . . ,Qn form a basis for Rn.
It follows that one can choose c = (c1, . . . , cn) ∈ Rn, such that
c · Q1 + A¯(Q1) = · · · = c · Qn + A¯(Qn),
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Figure 2. (Proof of Theorem 3.3) Level sets for A¯ restricted to each
region RAi are parallel line segments in Σ
B (in a 3 × 3 game).
and hence by (3),
A¯′(Q1) = · · · = A¯′(Qn).
Then level sets of A¯′ are boundaries of (n − 1)-dimensional simplices centred at EB (each
similar to the simplex with vertices Q1, . . . ,Qn).
Now we show that EB is a minimum for A¯′. By uniqueness of the completely mixed
Nash equilibrium and Lemma 1.2, A has a row vector which is not a multiple of (1, . . . , 1).
Therefore, there exists a vector v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ Rn with ∑k vk = 0, such that at least one
of the entries of Av is positive. Let r(t) = EB + t · v, t ≥ 0, be a ray from EB in ΣB. Then
for t2 > t1 we get
A¯′(r(t2)) − A¯′(r(t1)) = max
j
(AEB + t2Av) j −max
j
(AEB + t1Av) j = (t2 − t1) max
j
(Av) j > 0.
So, along some ray from EB, A¯′ is increasing. By the spherical structure of the level sets,
this implies that A¯′ is increasing along every ray from EB. Hence A¯′(EB) ≤ A¯′(q) for every
q ∈ ΣB with equality only for q = EB.
The same reasoning shows that one can choose d1, . . . , dn ∈ R and B′ ∈ Rn×n, b′i j =
bi j + di, such that B¯′(EA) ≤ B¯′(p) for every p ∈ ΣA with equality only for p = EA. 
The previous results, Theorem 3.3 and Proposition 3.1, assert that every game pos-
sesses a dynamically equivalent version, in which FP Pareto dominates Nash equilibrium
play. This shows that dynamical equivalence does not in general preserve the global payoff
structure of a game, since there are clearly games for which Pareto dominance of FP over
Nash equilibrium does not hold a priori.
In the famous Shapley game or variants of it [27, 28, 30], FP typically converges to a
limit cycle, known as a Shapley polygon [12], and usually the payoff along this polygon is
greater than the Nash equilibrium payoff in some parts of the cycle, and less in others. On
average, this can be still preferable for both players compared to playing Nash equilibrium,
if they aim to maximise their time-average payoffs. In a similar setting, this has been
previously observed in [12]. We will show an example of this situation in the next section.
In fact, the proof of Theorem 3.3 shows that the unique, completely mixed Nash equilib-
rium (EA, EB) can never be an isolated payoff-maximum, since there are always directions
from EB in ΣB and from EA in ΣA along which A¯ and B¯ are non-decreasing. Heuristi-
cally one would therefore expect that FP typically improves upon Nash equilibrium in at
least parts of any limit cycle. In Section 5 we will demonstrate that this is not always the
case: there are games in which FP typically produces a lower average payoff than Nash
equilibrium.
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4. FP better than Nash equilibrium: an example
Consider the one-parameter family of 3 × 3 bimatrix games (Aβ, Bβ), β ∈ (0, 1), given
by
Aβ =
1 0 ββ 1 00 β 1
 , Bβ =
−β 1 00 −β 11 0 −β
 . (4)
This family can be viewed as a generalisation of Shapley’s game [27]. In [28, 30], FP
dynamics of this family of games has been studied extensively, and the system has been
shown to give rise to a very rich chaotic dynamics with many unusual and remarkable
dynamical features. The game has a unique, completely mixed Nash equilibrium (EA, EB),
where EA = (EB)> = ( 13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 ), which yields the respective payoffs
uA(EA, EB) =
1 + β
3
and uB(EA, EB) =
1 − β
3
.
To check the hypothesis of Proposition 3.1, let q = (q1, q2, q3)> ∈ ΣB, then
A¯(q) = max {q1 + βq3, q2 + βq1, q3 + βq2}
≥ 1
3
((q1 + βq3) + (q2 + βq1) + (q3 + βq2))
=
1
3
(q1 + q2 + q3)(1 + β)
=
1 + β
3
= uA(EA, EB) = A¯(EB).
Moreover, equality holds if and only if
q1 + βq3 = q2 + βq1 = q3 + βq2,
which is equivalent to q1 = q2 = q3, that is, q = EB. We conclude that A¯(q) > A¯(EB) for
all q ∈ ΣB \ {EB}, and by a similar calculation, B¯(p) > B¯(EA) for all p ∈ ΣA \ {EA}. As a
corollary to Proposition 3.1 we get the following result.
Theorem 4.1. Consider the one-parameter family of bimatrix games (Aβ, Bβ) in (4) for
β ∈ (0, 1). Then any (non-stationary) FP orbit Pareto dominates constant Nash equilibrium
play in the long run, that is, for large times t we have
uˆA(t) > uA(EA, EB) and uˆB(t) > uB(EA, EB).
In fact, one can say more: There is a β ∈ (0, 1) such that FP has an attracting closed
orbit (the so-called ‘anti-Shapley orbit’ [28, 30]) along which FP Pareto dominates Nash
equilibrium at all times. In other words, both players are receiving a higher payoff than at
Nash equilibrium at any time along this orbit. We omit the details of the proof: techniques
developed in [20, 26] can be used to analyse FP along this orbit, whose existence was
shown in [28]. In particular, the times spent in each region RBj × RAi along the orbit can be
worked out explicitly, which can be directly applied to obtain average payoffs.
Remark 4.2. In fact, FP also improves upon the set of ‘correlated equilibria’ in this family
of games. The famous notion of correlated equilibrium, introduced in [1, 2], is defined as
follows. A joint probability distribution P = (pi j) over S = S A × S B is a correlated
equilibrium (CE) for the bimatrix game (A, B) if∑
k
ai′k pik ≤
∑
k
aik pik and
∑
l
bl j′ pl j ≤
∑
k
bl j pl j
for all i, i′ ∈ S A and j, j′ ∈ S B. One interpretation of this notion is similar to that of the CCE
(see paragraph after Definition 2.1), with the notion of ‘(unconditional) regret’ replaced by
the finer notion of ‘conditional regret’. If we think of P as the empirical distribution of
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play up to a certain time for two players involved in repeatedly or continuously playing
a given game, then P is a CE if neither player regrets not having played a strategy i′ (or
j′) whenever she actually played i (or j). In other words, the average payoff to player A
would not be higher, if she would have played i′ at all times when she actually played i
throughout the history of play (assuming her opponent’s behaviour unchanged), and the
same for player B.
One can check that the set of Nash equilibria is always contained in the set of CE, which
in turn is always contained in the set of CCE. In the game (Aβ, Bβ) in Theorem 4.1, the Nash
equilibrium (EA, EB) is also the unique CE, which can be checked by direct computation.
Hence our result shows that in this case, FP also improves upon CE in the long run.
5. FP can be worse than Nash equilibrium
We have seen that in many games FP improves upon Nash equilibrium in terms of
payoff. Moreover, we have shown that for any bimatrix game with unique, completely
mixed Nash equilibrium, linear equivalence can be used to obtain dynamically equivalent
examples in which FP Pareto dominates Nash equilibrium. In this section we investigate
the converse possibility of FP having lower payoff than Nash equilibrium. Again we restrict
our attention to n × n games with unique, completely mixed Nash equilibrium.
Let us define the sub-Nash payoff cones, the set of those mixed strategies of player A,
for which the best possible payoff to player B is not greater than Nash equilibrium payoff,
P−B = {p ∈ ΣA : maxi (pB)i ≤ maxi (E
AB)i},
and similarly
P−A = {q ∈ ΣB : maxj (Aq) j ≤ maxj (AE
B) j}.
By adding suitable constants to the player’s payoff matrices we can assume without loss of
generality that uA(EA, EB) = uB(EA, EB) = 0. Then one can see that
P−B = (B
>)−1(Rn−) ∩ ΣA and P−A = A−1(Rn−) ∩ ΣB,
where Rn− denotes the quadrant of Rn with all coordinates non-positive, and by (B>)−1 and
A−1 we mean the pre-images under the linear maps B>, A : Rn → Rn. Therefore, P−B and
P−A are (closed) convex cones in Σ
A and ΣB with apexes EA and EB respectively.
Now an orbit of FP is Pareto dominated by Nash equilibrium if and only if it (or its part
for t ≥ t0 for some t0) is contained in the interior of P−B × P−A. This shows that a result like
Theorem 3.3 with the roles of Nash equilibrium and FP reversed cannot hold: if a game has
an FP orbit whose projections to ΣA and ΣB are not both contained in some convex cones
with apexes EA and EB, then for any linearly equivalent game, along this orbit there are
times at which one of the players enjoys higher payoff than Nash equilibrium payoff. In
order to find FP orbits along which payoffs are permanently lower than Nash equilibrium
payoff, one therefore needs to find orbits contained in a halfspace (whose boundary plane
contains the Nash equilibrium). The following lemma ensures that one can then obtain a
linearly equivalent game with P−B × P−A containing this orbit.
Lemma 5.1. Let (A, B) be any n × n bimatrix game with unique, completely mixed Nash
equilibrium (EA, EB). Let HA and HB be open halfspaces such that EA ∈ ∂HA and EB ∈
∂HB. Let further CA and CB be closed convex polyhedral cones with non-empty interior
and apexes EA and EB respectively, such that
• CA \ {EA} ⊂ ΣA ∩ HA and CB \ {EB} ⊂ ΣB ∩ HB,
• CA (CB) contains exactly one of the line segments LBi \ {EA} (LAj \ {EB}) in its
interior,
• CA (CB) has exactly n−1 extreme rays, each lying in the interior of one of RBj (RAi ),
such that each RBj (R
A
i ) contains at most one such ray.
Then there exists a linearly equivalent game (A′, B′), such that P−B′ = CA and P
−
A′ = CB.
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Proof of Lemma 5.1. The proof follows the same line of argument as the proof of Theo-
rem 3.3 and therefore we will refer to that proof. Note that in the proof of Theorem 3.3, to
any given game we constructed a linearly equivalent game with P−A = {EB} and P−B = {EA}.
To prove the lemma, without loss of generality assume that LAn ⊂ CB, which implies that
∂CB has non-empty intersection with the interior of each of RAi for i , n. We can then pick
n−1 points Qi ∈ ∂CB∩ int(RAi ) on the n−1 extreme rays and similarly to the proof of The-
orem 3.3 prescribe the n linear equations A¯′(EB) = A¯′(Q1) = . . . = A¯′(Qn−1) = 0, where A′
is again the matrix obtained from A by adding constants c1, . . . , cn to its columns. This has
a unique solution for c = (c1, . . . , cn), since EB,Q1, . . . ,Qn−1 form a basis for Rn. Then,
by construction, A¯′ is 0 on ∂CB. Because of the structure of the level sets of A¯′ worked out
in the proof of Theorem 3.3, this implies that either CB or the closure of its complement in
ΣB is the set on which A¯′ ≤ 0 = A¯′(EB), that is, P−A′ . But since both CB and P−A′ are convex,
it follows that P−A′ = CB, and analogously one can find a linearly equivalent matrix B
′ so
that P−B′ = CA. 
By Lemma 5.1, to find an example of a game with an orbit which is Pareto worse than
Nash equilibrium, it suffices to find a game with an orbit whose projections to ΣA and ΣB are
completely contained in suitable convex cones with apexes EA and EB respectively. One
can then construct a linearly equivalent game, for which this orbit is actually contained in
the sub-Nash payoff cones. We will demonstrate one such example in the 3×3 case, which
we obtained by numerically randomly generating 3 × 3 games and testing large numbers
of initial conditions to detect orbits of the desired type.
Observe that by convexity of the preference regions RAi , a halfspace in Σ
B whose bound-
ary contains the (unique, completely mixed) Nash equilibrium contains at most two of the
three rays LAi , i = 1, 2, 3. The same holds for a halfspace in Σ
A and the rays LBj , j = 1, 2, 3.
Hence an orbit entirely contained in such halfspace never crosses at least one of these lines
for each player.
Example 5.2. Let the bimatrix game (A, B) be given by
A =
−1.353259 −1.268538 2.5727380.162237 −1.800824 1.584291−0.499026 −1.544578 1.992332
 , B =
−1.839111 −2.876997 −3.366031−4.801713 −3.854987 −3.7586626.740060 6.590451 6.898102
 .
This bimatrix game has a unique Nash equilibrium (EA, EB) with
EA ≈ (0.288, 0.370, 0.342), EB ≈ (0.335, 0.327, 0.338)>.
The matrices A and B are chosen in such a way that the Nash equilibrium payoffs are both
normalised to zero: uA(EA, EB) = uB(EA, EB) = 0. Numerical simulations suggest that FP
has a periodic orbit as a stable limit cycle, which attracts almost all initial conditions. This
trajectory forms an octagon in the four-dimensional space Σ = ΣA × ΣB, it is depicted in
Figure 3. The orbit follows an 8-periodic itinerary of the form
(2, 1)→ (2, 2)→ (3, 2)→ (3, 3)→ (1, 3)→ (1, 2)→ (1, 1)→ (3, 1)→ (2, 1).
(That is, there is a strictly increasing sequence of times (ti)i≥1 such that (p(t), q(t)) ∈ RB2×RA1
for t ∈ (t1, t2), (p(t), q(t)) ∈ RB2 × RA2 for t ∈ (t2, t3), (p(t), q(t)) ∈ RB3 × RA2 for t ∈ (t3, t4),
etc.) Note that the second player’s best response never changes from 1 to 2, nor vice versa.
Similarly, for player A the best response never directly changes between 1 and 3 without
an intermediate step through 2. Moreover, it can be seen from Figure 3 that the projections
of the periodic orbit to ΣA and ΣB lie in halfplanes whose boundaries contain the points EA
and EB respectively. Hence Lemma 5.1 allows us to choose the matrices A and B such that
this orbit lies completely in P−B × P−A, so that the payoffs to both players are permanently
worse than Nash equilibrium payoff. Figure 4 shows the (negative) payoffs to both players
along several periods of the orbit and the higher (zero) Nash equilibrium payoff.
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Figure 3. Periodic orbit whose projections to ΣA (left) and ΣB (right)
are contained in convex cones with apexes EA and EB respectively. The
dashed lines indicate the indifference lines of the players. Their intersec-
tions are the projections of the Nash equilibrium, EA and EB. For better
visibility, the bottom row shows a zoomed version of the periodic orbit.
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Figure 4. Payoff along 10 periods of the periodic orbit contained in P−B×
P−A. Player A’s payoff oscillates around −0.5, player B’s payoff around−0.25. Nash equilibrium payoff is zero to both players.
This example has been obtained through numerical experimentation. The difficulty in
finding an example of a periodic orbit with the key property of lying in a convex cone with
apex at the unique, completely mixed Nash equilibrium seems to suggest that such exam-
ples are relatively rare. For most games with unique, completely mixed Nash equilibrium,
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payoff along typical FP orbits either Pareto dominates Nash equilibrium payoff or at least
improves upon it along parts of the orbit. We formulate the following two conjectures.
Conjecture 5.3. Bimatrix games with unique, completely mixed Nash equilibrium, where
Nash equilibrium Pareto dominates typical FP orbits are rare. To be precise, within the
space of n × n games with entries in [0, 1], those where typical FP orbits are Pareto domi-
nated by Nash equilibrium form a set with at most Lebesgue measure 0.01.
Conjecture 5.4. For bimatrix games with unique, completely mixed Nash equilibrium and
certain transition combinatorics (see [25]), Nash equilibrium does not Pareto dominate
typical FP orbits. In particular, this is the case if BRA(e j) , BRA(e j′ ) for all j , j′ and
BRB(ei) , BRB(ei′ ) for all i , i′.
Indeed, we could strengthen the above conjecture to the following statement.
Conjecture 5.5. For ‘most’ bimatrix games with unique, completely mixed Nash equilib-
rium, typical FP orbits dominate Nash equilibrium in terms of average payoff. In particu-
lar, this is the case under certain assumptions on the transition combinatorics of the game;
for instance, if each pure strategy invokes a distinct pure best response (as in the previous
conjecture).
6. Concluding remarks on FP performance
Conceptually, the overall observation is that playing Nash equilibrium might not be an
advantage over playing according to some learning algorithm (such as FP) in a wide range
of games, in particular in many common examples of games occurring in the literature.
Even in cases where FP does not dominate Nash equilibrium at all times, it might still
be preferable in terms of time-averaged payoff. In contrast, the previous section shows
that there are examples in which Nash equilibrium indeed Pareto dominates FP, but the
restrictive nature of the example suggests that this situation is quite rare.
Conversely, the discussion also shows that certain notions of game equivalence (for
instance, linear equivalence, or the weaker best and better response equivalences, see [23,
24]), which are popular in the literature on learning dynamics, are not meaningful in an eco-
nomic context as they do not preserve essential features of the payoff structure of games,
even though they preserve Nash equilibria (and other notions of equilibrium) and condi-
tional preferences of the players. While some dynamics (in particular, FP dynamics or
its autonomous version, the best response dynamics [13, 21, 19]) are invariant under all
of these equivalence relations, the actual payoffs along their orbits and the payoff com-
parison of different orbits can strongly depend on the chosen representative bimatrix, as
becomes apparent from Theorem 3.3. This is to some extent analogous to the situation in
the classical example of the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ given by the bimatrix
A =
(
3 0
5 1
)
, B =
(
3 5
0 1
)
.
Under linear equivalence, this corresponds to the bimatrix game
A˜ =
(
0 0
2 1
)
, B˜ =
(
0 2
0 1
)
,
which shares all essential features such as equilibria, best response structures, etc with the
prisoner’s dilemma. Both games are dynamically identical, with all FP orbits converging
along straight lines to the unique pure Nash equilibrium (2, 2). However, the second game
does not constitute a prisoner’s dilemma in the classical sense: whereas in the prisoner’s
dilemma the Nash equilibrium is Pareto dominated by the (dynamically irrelevant) strategy
profile (1, 1), in the second game this is not the case and no ‘dilemma’ occurs.
Theorem 3.3 can be interpreted in a similar vain: linear equivalence turns out to be
sufficiently coarse, so that by changing the representative bimatrix inside an equivalence
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class, one can create certain regions in Σ in which payoff is arbitrarily high in comparison
to the payoff at the unique Nash equilibrium. Since FP orbits remain unchanged, this can
be done in such a way that a given periodic orbit lies completely or predominantly in these
desired ‘high payoff portions’ of Σ. On the other hand, it can be seen from the proof
that the conditions for this to happen are not at all exceptional. Consequently, it could be
argued that in many games of interest the assumption that Nash equilibrium play is the
most desirable outcome might not hold and a more dynamic view of ‘optimal play’ might
be reasonable.
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